Abstract-We consider the problem of coordinating two competing multiple-antenna wireless systems (operators) that operate in the same spectral band. We formulate a rate region which is achievable by scalar coding followed by power allocation and beamforming. We show that all interesting points on the Pareto boundary correspond to transmit strategies where both systems use the maximum available power. We then argue that there is a fundamental need for base station cooperation when performing spectrum sharing with multiple transmit antennas. More precisely, we show that if the systems do not cooperate, there is a unique Nash equilibrium which is inefficient in the sense that the achievable rate is bounded by a constant, regardless of the available transmit power. An extension of this result to the case where the receivers use successive interference cancellation (SIC) is also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background W E ARE CONCERNED with the following scenario: Two independent wireless systems operate in the same spectral band. The first system consists of a base station BS 1 that wants to convey information to a mobile MS 1 . The second system consists of another base station BS 2 that wants to transmit information to a mobile MS 2 . The systems share the same spectrum, so the communication between BS 1 →MS 1 and BS 2 →MS 2 is going to take place simultaneously on the same channel. Thus MS 1 will hear a superposition of the signals transmitted from BS 1 and BS 2 , and conversely MS 2 will also receive the sum of the signals transmitted by both base stations. This setup is recognized as an interference channel (IFC) [1] - [3] . In the setup we consider, BS 1 and BS 2 have n transmit antennas each, that can be used with full phase coherency. MS 1 and MS 2 , however, have a single receive antenna each. Hence our problem setup constitutes a multiple-input single-output (MISO) IFC. See Figure 1 .
We shall assume that transmission consists of scalar coding followed by beamforming, 1 and that all propagation channels are frequency-flat. This leads to the following basic model for the matched-filtered, symbol-sampled complex baseband data received at MS 1 and MS 2 : where s 1 and s 2 are transmitted symbols, h ij is the (complexvalued) n × 1 channel-vector between BS i and MS j , and w i is the beamforming vector used by BS i . The variables e 1 , e 2 are noise terms which we model as i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ 2 . We assume that each base station can use the transmit power P , but that power cannot be traded between the base stations. Without loss of generality, we shall take P = 1. This gives the power constraint
Throughout, we define the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as 1/σ 2 . Various schemes that we will discuss require that the transmitters (BS 1 and BS 2 ) have different forms of channel state information (CSI). However, at no point we will require phase coherency between the base stations.
The fundamental question we want to address is the following. If BS 1 and BS 2 operate in an uncoordinated manner, how should they choose their beamforming vectors w 1 , w 2 ? There is an obvious conflict situation associated with this choice since a vector w 1 which is good for the link BS 1 →MS 1 may generate substantial interference for MS 2 and vice versa. The main contribution of this work is to discuss this conflict situation in a game-theoretic framework. In the course of doing so, we will also present an achievable rate region for the MISO IFC and a characterization of this region.
We stress that in our setup there is no central controller that can dictate what beamforming vectors the two systems (BS 1 and BS 2 ) should use. That is, we assume that the two systems belong to different infrastructure (for example, are owned by different operators) and hence that they have fundamentally conflicting interests. This stands in sharp contrast to the case (not considered in this paper) when the systems belong to the same infrastructure and are connected via a central controller that has the authority to determine how resources are shared. In the case with a central controller, there would be no conflict between the systems (in a game-theoretic sense), as the controller can decide on any arbitrary operating point at its choice. Notwithstanding this, even if there is no central controller with authority to dictate the resource use, BS 1 and BS 2 may still communicate with each other in order to negotiate how resources should be split. Such communication may take place directly by using a carefully crafted, possibly standardized protocol for this, or indirectly (by using iterative punishment schemes as discussed in [12] ). To summarize, the two basic points are: (i) the absence of a central controller does not mean that the systems cannot talk (negotiate) with one another; and (ii) having a central controller or not is not an issue of performance, rather, the cases with and without a central controller are two fundamentally different problems.
B. Related work
Information-theoretic studies of the IFC have a long history [1] - [3] , [5] . These references have provided various achievable rate regions, which are generally larger in the more recent papers than in the earlier ones. However, the capacity region of the general IFC channel is still an open problem. For certain limiting cases, for example when the interference is weak or very strong, respectively, the sum capacity is known [6] . For weak interference the interference can simply be treated as additional noise. For very strong interference, successive interference cancellation (SIC) can be applied at one or more of the receivers. Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) IFCs have also recently been studied in [7] , from the perspective of spatial multiplexing gains.
Recently an increasing body of literature has looked at resource conflict problems in wireless communications using tools from game theory (see, for example [8] ). Most of this work deals with networking aspects of communications. There is some available work, however, that studies the IFC from a game-theoretic perspective. In what follows, we summarize the relevant literature that we are aware of. Distributed algorithms for spectrum sharing in a competitive setup (using noncooperative game theory [9] ) were developed in [10] and [11] . A more general analysis of the spectrum sharing problem was performed in [12] . All three [10] - [12] dealt with single-antenna transmitters and receivers, and looked at the problem from a noncooperative game-theoretic point of view. The MIMO IFC has also been studied from a noncooperative game-theoretic perspective in [13] and [14] , which presented results on equilibrium rates and proposed distributed algorithms. These noncooperative approaches [10] - [13] generally lead to decentralized schemes for computing stable operating points, socalled Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, these equilibria are often rather inefficient outcomes, as measured by the achievable sum-rate, for example. Less work is available on cooperative game theory for IFCs, especially for multiple-antenna IFCs. Some results can be found in [15] which treated the spectrum sharing problem using cooperative (bargaining) game theory and [16] which proposed a decentralized algorithm for finding the bargaining solution. Both [15] , [16] considered the case of single antennas at the transmitter and at the receiver. Apart from this, the area of cooperative strategies for the IFC appears largely open. (We shall note [17] that deals with the multipleaccess channel (MAC) using coalitional game theory. However the MAC differs fundamentally from the IFC.)
Contributions: We study the MISO IFC both from a noncooperative (competitive) game theoretic perspective, and from a cooperative (bargaining) point of view. We show that the outcome of the noncooperative game is a unique Nash equilibrium but that this is rather bad from an overall system perspective (see Section III-A). We then consider the same problem using cooperative (Nash axiomatic bargaining) theory and show that this can significantly improve the outlook of the problem (see Section III-B). Before we embark on this, we present in Section II some preliminaries, and various other interesting results related to the MISO IFC. This paper is reproducible research [18] and the software needed to generate the numerical results can be obtained from www.commsys.isy.liu.se/˜egl/rr.
II. ACHIEVABLE RATES AND OPERATING POINTS

A. An Achievable Rate Region
In what follows we will assume that all receivers treat co-channel interference as noise, i.e., they make no attempt to decode and subtract the interference. (This assumption will be relaxed in Section V.) The main justification for this assumption is that in most envisioned applications, MS i would use receivers with a simple structure. Additionally, one can argue that interference cancellation is difficult in an environment where the receivers do not know the coding and modulation schemes used by the interfering transmitters. For a given pair of beamforming vectors {w 1 , w 2 }, the following rates are then achievable, by using codebooks approaching Fig. 2 . Rate region, example 1. The channels were chosen at random but such that R is convex. Here the signal-to-noise-ratio is 0 dB.
for the link BS 1 →MS 1 , and
for BS 2 →MS 2 . For fixed channels {h ij }, we define the achievable rate region as
We stress that this is not the capacity region, because it does not take into account the possibility of performing interference cancellation at the receivers, and it does not take into account the possibility of going beyond Gaussian signaling. However the rates in R are achievable with simple receiver signal processing, that treats interference as noise. (Extensions to interference cancellation are discussed in Section V.) The outer boundary of R is called the Pareto boundary, because it consists of Pareto optimal operating points. A Pareto optimal point is a point at which one cannot improve the rate of one link without simultaneously decreasing the rate of the other. We denote the Pareto boundary by R * . Note that for fixed h ij , the region R is compact, since the set {w 1 , w 2 } subject to the power constraint (1) is compact and the mapping from {w 1 , w 2 } to {R 1 , R 2 } is continuous. However, the region R is in general not convex.
We define the convex hull of R as follows:
Also we denote the Pareto boundary ofR withR * . The region R can be interpreted as the set of achievable outcomes if the two systems BS 1 →MS 1 and BS 2 →MS 2 are allowed to split the available degrees of freedom (time or bandwidth in practice) offered by the channel in two parts, and use the beamforming vectors {w 1 , w 2 } (corresponding to a rate point (R 1 , R 2 )) during a fraction τ of the time, and another set of beamforming vectors {w 1 , w 2 } (corresponding to a different rate point (R 1 , R 2 )) during the rest of the time (i.e., during a fraction 1 − τ of the total time). Implicit in this interpretation is the assumption that the power constraint (1) is unchanged, i.e., the constraint is on the peak power rather than on the long-term average of power. Another interpretation ofR is in terms of correlated mixed strategies:R is the set of average rates that can be achieved if the two systems decide on two arbitrary rate points in R and then flip a synchronized coin to decide which one of these two points to operate at. The importance of working withR instead of R will become clear when we formulate the beamforming problem as a bargaining problem (Section III-B). Figures 2 and 3 show two examples of the rate region R. In the first example the channels are chosen so that R is convex; in the second example R is nonconvex. The figures also show the convex hullR. (The other rate points in the figures will be explained in what follows.) These figures were generated by computing (R 1 , R 2 ) over a grid of beamforming vectors, as explained in more detail in Section IV.
B. Characterization of the Pareto Boundary
A first question to ask is whether any point on the Pareto boundary of R (orR) can be reached unless both BS 1 and BS 2 spend the maximum allowable power, i.e., whether
We will show that the only points on the Pareto boundary which can be achieved without having w 1 2 = w 2 2 = 1 are points where the tangent to the Pareto boundary is either strictly vertical or strictly horizontal. The importance of this observation is that apart from pieces of the Pareto boundary that are strictly vertical or horizontal, it is enough to consider parameterizations of the boundary for which w 1 2 = w 2 2 = 1. More precisely we have the following proposition. Proposition 1: a) Consider a point (R 1 , R 2 ) in the rate region R which corresponds to a set of beamforming vectors (w 1 , w 2 ) for which w 1 2 < 1 and w 2 2 ≤ 1. Then there exists a beamforming vectorŵ 1 , such that the rate operating point (R 1 ,R 2 ) associated with (ŵ 1 , w 2 ) satisfies
In other words, it is possible to improve the rate of system 1 by changing w 1 in a way so that BS 1 uses more power, and simultaneously keep w 2 unchanged. b) The result in (a) holds also if R is replaced byR. Proof: See the Appendix. Note that the converse is not true. Many points in the interior of R andR correspond to beamforming vectors for which both base stations use full power.
C. Some Special Operating Points
Some points in the rate region are especially interesting, and we discuss them as follows (in no particular order).
1) The single-user (SU) points (R SU 1 , 0) and (0, R SU 2 ) are the rate points that result if only one user transmits, assuming the base station has full channel knowledge and performs maximum-ratio transmission beamforming (i.e., w 1 = h * 11 / h 11 and w 2 = h * 22 / h 22 , respectively, as in singleuser MISO transmission [4] , [19] ). The associated rates are
Note that all convex combinations of the points (R We can characterize the average rates associated with the single-user points as follows. Define
where
is the incomplete Gamma function. Then, if {h ii } have independent zero-mean Gaussian elements with unit variance (i.e., the fading is i.i.d. Rayleigh) we have
This follows by applying the results presented in [20, Section IV.B]. Equation (4) shows that the average single-user rate grows logarithmically with the SNR. Unfortunately, this is not of much interest since the single-user points are unstable outcomes of the resource conflict in the sense that if the systems operate at one of these points, then any of the systems can improve its rate by unilaterally changing its beamforming vector. This goes also for convex combinations of the singleuser points: they are not stable operating points unless the systems have pre-agreed to use orthogonal time-sharing.
2) The best-user (BU) point (R
is the rate point which is achieved if the system with the best channel (in the sense of largest channel norm) uses all resources and the other system stays quiet. More precisely we have
It is clear that the average rate associated with the bestuser point is at least as good as any of the single-user rates. However, like the single-user points, the best-user operating point is unstable as well.
3) The sum-rate (SR) point (R
is the point at which R 1 + R 2 is maximized. Geometrically, this the point where the Pareto boundary of R osculates a straight line with slope −1. (This point is also shown in Figures 2-3 .)
The expected sum-rate grows logarithmically with the SNR. This is clear by considering the following chain of inequalities:
and using (5) . In (8), the first inequality follows because the line with slope -1 which touches R * must lie to the upper right of both the points (R SU 1 , 0) and (0, R SU 2 ). The second inequality in (8) is immediate. However, a more precise analytical characterization of the sum-rate point appears nontrivial. Fortunately, this is not of much interest anyway, because like the two other rate points discussed above, the sum-rate operating point is also unstable.
4) The zero-forcing (ZF) point (R
is the rate pair which is achieved if BS 1 chooses a transmit strategy that creates no interference at all for MS 2 , and vice versa. If we assume that both base stations use the maximum permitted power, then BS 1 should use a unit-norm beamforming vector w 1 which is orthogonal to h 12 and which at the same time maximizes |w T 1 h 11 |. This beamformer is uniquely defined and is given by
where H where U H U = I and let z = U p for some p. Then |z H y| = |y H U p| and z = p . Clearly, |y H U p| is maximized, subject to the constraint p = 1, for
The corresponding rates are
We can characterize the performance with ZF as follows.
Proposition 2: Suppose the fading is i.i.d. Rayleigh and that all channels are independent. Then the average achievable rates if both users perform ZF are given by
where G(·, ·) is defined in (4) . Proof: See the Appendix. Comparing Proposition 2 with the single-user rates (see (5)), we see that the transmitter interference cancellation offered by ZF costs precisely one degree of freedom (since n is reduced to n − 1 in the argument of G (·, ·) ). For a small number of antennas, e.g., n = 2, this will have a major impact on performance. For a large number of antennas, however, the reduction in the number of degrees of freedom associated with ZF is negligible, and the ZF rates will be close to the singleuser rates on the average.
The rate in (12) grows with increasing SNR without bound. It is also clear that at high SNR, the ZF point will not lie far away from the Pareto boundary. (This can also be seen in Figure 3 .) The reason for this is that the rates associated with ZF and the sum-rate point (which is located at the Pareto boundary, by definition) both grow logarithmically with SNR; hence the normalized difference between these rates does not increase. The operational implication of this is not very important, however, because unless the systems have established a binding agreement to use ZF, then ZF is not going to be a stable outcome of the spectrum resource conflict. (This is so for the same reasons as the sum-rate point was not stable.)
Note that ZF transmission can be implemented without requiring the base stations to cooperate on channel estimation. Namely, ZF only requires that BS 1 knows the channels h 11 and h 12 (and that BS 2 knows h 22 and h 21 ). In a time-division multiplexing system, BS 1 could directly measure the channels of interest without the help of BS 2 , and vice versa.
III. BEAMFORMING AS A GAME THEORETIC PROBLEM In this section we will treat the beamforming problem in a game-theoretic framework. We will separately discuss the two cases that the systems can cooperate, respectively not cooperate, in choosing their beamforming vectors. Whenever we refer to "cooperation" in this paper, we mean cooperation in the sense of the theory for non-zero-sum games [21] .
A. Competitive (Non-cooperative) Solution
If BS 1 , BS 2 do not cooperate then the only reasonable outcome of the spectrum conflict will be an operating point which constitutes a Nash equilibrium. This is a point where none of the base stations can improve its situation by unilaterally changing w i , subject to the power constraint [21] . It is clear (and more generally shown in [12] ) that at a Nash Equilibrium both users must use the entire available bandwidth and time, so we make that assumption for the rest of this subsection. A Nash equilibrium is then a pair of vectors w 
The corresponding rates at the equilibrium are
Note that by using w .) The Nash equilibrium is contained in R, but in general it does not lie on the Pareto boundary. At low SNR, the Nash equilibrium is not a bad outcome since σ 2 will dominate over the interference terms in (13). Hence using w NE i (which amounts to maximum-ratio beamforming) will maximize the rate of each user. However, at high SNR, the equilibrium outcome of the game is generally poor for both systems. This observation is made precise in the following result.
Proposition 4: Suppose the systems operate in i.i.d. Rayleigh fading (the entries of h ij independent and complex Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance). Then the average Nash equilibrium rates are bounded by
for i = 1, 2, where Ψ(x) is the Psi (DiGamma) function and γ is Euler's constant. The upper bound in (14) is tight for high SNR (σ 2 → 0). Proof: See the Appendix. The basic implication of Proposition 4 is that to achieve high rates in unlicensed bands, the systems need somehow to cooperate. For two transmit antennas (n = 2), the upper bound in (14) is given by
This result corresponds well with the numerical result that we will present in Section IV (Figure 4 ). Another consequence of Proposition 4 is that since Ψ(x) = O(log(x)), the equilibrium rate can grow at most logarithmically with the number of transmit antennas per base station, n. This means that adding more antennas help only marginally, if the systems compete with each other. (By using SIC, a higher average sum rate could be achieved. We discuss this briefly in Section V.) Note that generally a Nash equilibrium is not an optimal, or even desirable, solution in any sense (although misconceptions around this appear to exist). Rather, the equilibrium is a point where one is likely to end up operating if BS 1 and BS 2 compete with each other. All we can say of this outcome is that the result can become no worse, if the base stations choose beamformers by unilateral action. In fact, in many games (including the one studied here) the Nash equilibrium is unique but it corresponds to an outcome which is bad for all players. See, the famous exampe of prisoner's dilemma, for example [21] . The inefficiency of Nash equilibria in a general system-wide context is further discussed in [22] .
B. Cooperative (Nash Bargaining) Solution
If BS 1 and BS 2 were able to cooperate, they could achieve rates higher than (R
2 ) (NB as in Nash Bargaining, to be defined). By reaching an appropriate agreement they could achieve any point inR or on the Pareto boundary. It is clear that if an agreement could be reached then R NB i ≥ R NE i , since otherwise at least one of the base stations would resort to the competitive (noncooperative) solution, which we know guarantees each link a rate of at least R NE i . Thus we may restrict the search for cooperative solutions to the subregionR + that consists of all points ofR for which R i ≥ R NE i , i.e. the set of points located to the upper right of the Nash equilibrium.
For example, the base stations could agree to operate at the sum-rate or ZF point. However, such an outcome is not likely to occur in practice, unless it is imposed by regulation. Additionally, if such a regulation is imposed it would be very hard to check whether the base stations comply with it. The reason is that generally one of the base stations would have to "give in" more than the other in order to agree on a specific operating point (such as the ZF or the sum-rate point). The basic issue is that if the players try to agree on a point on the Pareto boundary, then any incremental improvement for one leads to a reduction for the other.
We will examine this problem by using the axiomatic bargaining theory developed by economist John Nash in the 1950's (and who was subsequently awarded the Nobel prize in economics) [21] , [23] . Nash considered the general problem of establishing an agreement between players with conflicting objectives, under the assumption that there exists no utility (in our case "rate", but in general, money for example) that one player could pay to the other in order to compensate the other for a non-favorable outcome. 3 Thus, the players must agree on an outcome (R NB 1 , R NB 2 ). If they fail, they will resort to playing non-cooperatively which generally results in an operating point no better than (R NE 1 , R NE 2 ). This fallback point is generally called a "threat point" in bargaining theory, because it represents the outcome in the event the players would realize their threat not to cooperate.
Nash showed that under certain conditions there is a unique mapping between the convex hull of the achievable region (R), the threat point (which we take to be (R 2 ). The conditions stated by Nash are a set of axioms. Apart from technicalities, these essentially say that the cooperative outcome must lie on the Pareto boundary, and that the solution should be independent of irrelevant bargaining alternatives in the sense that if the solution is contained in a subset ofR, sayR , then the same bargaining solution would have been obtained if the feasible set had beenR at the outset. Additionally, invariance to linear transformations is required (see [21] for details).
The Nash solution for the two player game at hand can be explicitly computed as follows:
In other words, the outcome of the bargaining is going to be the point where the Pareto boundaryR * has exactly one intersection point with a curve of the form 2 ). Achieving the Nash bargaining solution will require the two systems to communicate in one way or another. (See also the paragraph of discussion at the end of Section I-A.) In this work we assume that there is a vehicle that facilitates such communication, for example via a standardized protocol specifically developed for resource bargaining. Note also that the Nash bargaining solution is only defined for convex outcome regions. Thus, it requires that the systems are willing to perform time-sharing using a pair of two different beamforming vectors as explained in Section II-A (see the discussion whereR was defined). However, a negotiation about time-sharing does not appear to be substantially more difficult than bargaining about beamforming vectors.
We finally remark on the notion of fairness versus Nash bargaining. If the Nash bargaining theory is applied with a threat point at the origin (corresponding to zero rates if no cooperation is reached, rather than using the equilibrium rates), then the NB solution will coincide with the outcome of the following maximization problem
The solution to (15) is sometimes called a "proportional fair" allocation. (See [24] for an extensive discussion of the relation between Nash bargaining and proportional fair allocation.) However, it is important to stress that the Nash bargaining solution has nothing to do with "fairness" in general. Rather it is an attempt to predict what will happen if the players act strict rationally, i.e., they want to cooperate but nevertheless act with self-interest. Generally, a player who is already in a good position will gain more because he can be stronger in a negotiation (his threat is more effective). There are numerous examples in economics where the Nash bargaining solution would be considered unfair for most human observers [25] .
C. A Reduced Game
To obtain some additional insight we consider the following two-person general-sum game in which the two systems can choose between playing the NE solution and the ZF solution.
In Table I , the rate R i corresponds to the outcome in which one system plays its minimax-optimal single-user strategy (NE) and the other system performs ZF:
Similarly, the rate R i corresponds to the case in which system i performs ZF but the other system performs NE:
and similarly for R 2 . Hence, we have the following inequality chain:
We can distinguish between the following fundamentally different cases:
1) The ZF rates in Table I are lower than the NE rates for both systems. This is illustrated in Table II . Here the first row dominates over the second row, and the first column dominates over the second column. This means that the NE strategy is the optimal strategy, regardless of whether the systems want to cooperate.
2) The ZF rates of both systems are larger than the NE rates (see Table III for an example). This corresponds to the classical "prisoner's dilemma" situation [21] . Here the NE strategy is the only stable outcome, but the ZF rates are better.
3) The ZF rate is larger than the NE rate for one of the systems, but not for the other one. This configuration is a mix of the two scenarios above. The NE is better for one player whereas the ZF is better for the other. We can quantitatively characterize the high-SNR performance of the rate points in the reduced game, using the high-SNR offset concept from [26] . Denote the average throughput (as a function of the SNR, ρ 1 σ 2 ) by C(ρ). Following [26] , introduce the following two high SNR measures:
and
The measure S ∞ is called the high-SNR slope and L ∞ is called the high-SNR power offset. At high SNR, the average throughput behaves like
We have the following results.
Corollary 1:
The average achievable rate if both systems perform ZF has the following high-SNR characteristics:
.
Proof: Follows directly from Proposition 2 and the definition in (18) or from [26, Proposition 1] with n = 1.
Corollary 2: An upper bound on the average achievable rate if one system performs NE and the other performs ZF, i.e. R i , has the following high-SNR characteristics:
Proof:
The corollary is another application of [26, Proposition 1].
Corollary 3: A lower bound on the average achievable rate in the "worst" case, when the user performs ZF but the other user performs NE satisfies
Proof: This follows from Proposition 4 and the observation that exponentially distributed random variables occur in the numerator as well as in the denominator of (17) .
The high-SNR analysis in this section is summarized in Table IV. The analysis, together with the result in Proposition 4, indicate that the reduced two-person MISO IFC game with a binary strategy space ends up in the Prisoner's dilemma configuration. This observation is interesting since it shows that efficient resource allocation on the MISO IFC will require cooperative strategies, even if the problem is simplified to comprise only the two (highly practical) beamforming modes ZF and NE.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We performed numerical experiments to gain insight into the phenomena analyzed in Sections II-III and the corresponding scaling laws. For a fixed channel realization, the rate region R was approximated by setting
T and then varying {α 1 
4 points were searched for each channel realization). 4 The Nash equilibrium and the rate points discussed in Section II-C are easy to compute. We found the Nash bargaining solution numerically by an interval-halving type search.
Illustrations of typical regions were given in Figures 2-3 . We also computed the average rates in i.i.d. Rayleigh fading. The computation was accomplished by numerical averaging over 2000 channel realizations. The result is shown in Figure 4 . This figure confirms the conclusion of Proposition 4, regarding the high-SNR behavior of the Nash equilibrium. We can also see that all other rates grow with the SNR. Most interestingly, the Nash bargaining solution is about as good as zero-forcing, and it is not far from the sum-rate point. (Neither of the two latter points would be achievable by voluntary bargaining, unless enforced by regulations.) This observation forms one of our major empirical conclusions.
V. EXTENSION TO SIC UNDER STRONG INTERFERENCE
If the received interference is strong at one of the receivers, this receiver may use successive interference cancellation (SIC). More precisely, it can decode the message intended for the other user first and then subtract it from the received signal before decoding the information of interest [5] . Arguably schemes based on SIC are somewhat impractical since even if implementation issues such as timing-and frequency synchronization (at very low signal-to-interference ratios) could be solved, they would require that the systems know the coding and modulation formats of each other. Nevertheless, it is interesting to investigate whether application of SIC would fundamentally change the conclusions of Sections III-IV. To explore this, we make the following two observations. Proposition 5: The Nash equilibrium in Proposition 3 is unchanged if SIC is used.
Proof: If a mobile performs SIC, then this will only affect the noise-and-interference term of its received signal (i.e., the terms in the denominator in (2) and (3)). Therefore the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3 will directly translate.
Proposition 6:
Consider the two-user MISO IFC in Figure 1 and define the squared effective channel gain a ij from BS i to MS j , after power allocation and beamforming, as a ij = |w and R 2 = log 2 1 + a22 a12+σ 2 . Proof: Case (a) is clear because MS 1 must be able to decode the signal intended for MS 2 in the presence of noise with power σ 2 , treating the signal intended for MS 1 as interference (this has power a 11 ). Case (b) follows similarly. Case (c) also follows by similar reasoning, but here, the interfering signals have much higher rate since it is assumed that both MS 1 and MS 2 can do SIC.
Note that the conditions (a) and (b) in Proposition 6 do not generally imply the condition (c). That is, the conditions (a) and (b) may be satisfied, but this does not mean that both MS 1 and MS 2 can do SIC simultaneously. If both (a) and (b) are satisfied, then one must choose whether MS 1 or MS 2 should be allowed to do SIC (and communicate with the correspondingly higher rate). This leads to a new type of conflict situation, since it is not clear whether the systems would easily agree on who will get the benefit from the SIC. Thus the achievable rates, in the event that both conditions in (a) and (b) are satisfied, are not well defined. Based on this observation, we construct the following bounds on the achievable rate (from the perspective of MS 1 ): Figure 5 (average over 10 5 channel realizations). We can see that if the systems agree to let MS 1 perform SIC whenever it is possible (hence forcing MS 2 to sacrifice any possible benefit of SIC), then the achievable rate for MS 1 indeed appears to grow unbounded with the transmit power. (This is the "upper bound" in the figure. ) Conversely, if the agreement instead is to let MS 2 perform SIC whenever possible but deprive MS 1 of this possibility, then MS 1 will have the opportunity to do SIC only if condition (c) is satisfied (i.e., when both mobiles can simultaneously do SIC). This is not enough to bring a significant increase in the achievable rate; in fact, the rate appears to be bounded regardless of power. (This is the "lower bound" in the figure. )
To conclude, application of SIC can potentially provide a significant increase in the equilibrium rates. But this requires that the systems can agree on who (MS 1 or MS 2 ) should be allowed to do SIC. This conflict situation might be modeled and analyzed as a game in itself. However, even the most positive outcome of this conflict game (corresponding to the upper bound in Figure 5 ) stands short of the bargaining solution to the original beamforming problem (see the "Nash bargaining" curve in Figure 4 ). Based on this one might conjecture that SIC will not make a fundamental difference to the way one should view conflict games on the MISO interference channel.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have considered the conflict situation that arises when two multiple-antenna systems must share the same (unlicensed) spectrum band. We have made two central points. First, we showed that if the systems do not cooperate, then the corresponding equilibrium rates are bounded regardless of how much transmit power the base stations have available. The important consequence of this is that there is a fundamental need for base station (system) cooperation in spectrum sharing with multiple antennas. Second, in numerical experiments, we found that the outcome of a Nash bargaining between the two systems can on the average be close to the sum-rate bound. This indicates that in reality, selfish but cooperating systems may achieve close to the max-sum-rate performance. It remains to develop protocols that the systems can use to communicate and actually reach the bargaining agreements whose existence we have predicted theoretically. The work here can be extended in several directions. One may study the case where only partial (for example, long-term) channel state information is available. The theory may also be extended to multiple antennas at the receivers (i.e., MIMO). Another direction concerns the specific choice of cooperative game-theoretic axiomatic framework. We have chosen the Nash bargaining theory because it is well-established, and since it enabled us to compute the bargaining point numerically, with relative ease. Other approaches to cooperative games (e.g., λ-transfer theory) may also be possible.
A number of open problems remain. For example, numerical results indicate that the rates of the bargaining solution grow logarithmically with SNR, although we do not have an analytical proof at this point. Also, a more precise characterization of the ZF solution and its distance to the Pareto boundary may be of interest. We leave these issues for future work.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1:
We need to show the existence of a nonzero perturbation vector δ such that
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition to satisfy (21) where x is independent of y, x is χ 2 distributed with n complex degrees of freedom, i.e. p(x) = x n−1 exp(−x)Γ(n)
and y is standard exponentially distributed, i.e. p(y) = exp(−y). First, we evaluate the expectation with respect to y for σ 2 → 0 to obtain E x,y log 2 1 + x y = E x 1 log(2) (log(x) + γ + e x Ei(1, x))
where γ is Euler's constant and Ei(1, x) denotes the exponential integral. Finally, computing the expectation with respect to x gives
(Ψ(n) + γ + e x Ei(1, x)) = Ψ(n) + γ + 1/n log(2) .
